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ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts are relevant to issues not apparent 
from the trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law, and therefore not treated in Appellant's Brief, but 
raised initially in Respondents' Brief: 
1. Paragraph 9 of Rita Luke's Independent Contractor 
Agreement states: 
[Luke] shall have no authority to incur any 
expense, enter any contract or make any 
representation or committment [sic] for and on 
behalf of [Prowswood] unless such authority is 
specifically given, in writing, with respect to 
each such transaction. 
2. As of the date of the Luke Agreement, November 29, 
1985, John Langley was "the broker" or "the acting broker" at 
Prowswood. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 125, 161. 
3. John Langley had no authority to purchase real 
property on behalf of Prowswood. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, 
p. 126. 
4. Expert witness Wilburn McDougal testified, "I think 
most companies have had some type of a guaranteed sales 
program." Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 130 (emphasis added). 
5. Mr. McDougal further testified that, with respect 
to his own company's guaranteed sales program, at times only 
he was authorized to sign a buy-back agreement, at times one 
of his managers could sign, and at times certain real estate 
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agents, those that had "the experience," could sign. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1. p. 132. 
6. Mr. McDougal further testified that some agents 
were authorized to sign buy-back agreements for his company 
and some were not; it was an "individual situation." Trial 
Transcript. Vol. 1, p. 132. 
7. Mr. McDougal did not testify that it was usual, 
typical, or incidental to their express authority for real 
estate agents to bind their brokers to buy-back agreements. 
8. The Nielsons1 son-in-law, Vince Clayton, was a 
Prowswood employee at the time the Agreement was signed, and 
had been for 15 years. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 38. 
9. On June 10, 1986, Richard S. Prows wrote a letter 
to the Nielsons on behalf of Prowswood in which the 
corporation refused to accept the obligation to purchase the 
Nielsons' property. Exhibit 4-P. (A copy is included in the 
Addendum to Prowswood's Brief of Appellant.) 
10. According to the uncontradicted testimony of 
Richard S. Prows, Prowswood did not consider itself obligated 
to repurchase the Nielsons1 property. Trial Transcript, Vol. 
2./ P- 11. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of Review, The trial court's rulings on 
agency and ratification are best viewed as presenting 
questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact. As 
such, they are entitled to no deference on appeal but should 
be reviewed for correctness. 
2. Statute of Frauds. The statute of frauds was 
sufficiently raised below and should be addressed on appeal. 
3. The "General Agent" Exception. The general agent 
exception to the statute of frauds does not apply to this 
case because Rita Luke was a special agent with respect to 
the purchase of real estate. 
4. Statutory Authority of Real Estate Agents. White v. 
Fox misreads the predecessor to Section 61-2-2. Furthermore, 
it is distinguishable on several grounds, the most important 
being that John Langley, not Prowswood, was Rita Luke's 
broker. White should not be extended by this Court. 
5. Inherent Authority. The trial court did not find 
that Ms. Luke exercised inherent authority, nor does the 
record warrant such a finding. 
6. Ratification. Far from manifesting an intent to be 
bound, Richard S. Prows' June 10, 1986 letter rejects any 
obligation to purchase the Nielsons' property. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. 
THIS COURT IS ENTITLED TO REVIEW 
THE TRIAL COURTfS JUDGMENT FOR CORRECTNESS 
a. Agency Presents a Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 
The nature and extent of a person's agency authority has 
been held to be a mixed question of law and fact. Marouez v. 
Raoid Harvest Co.. 1 Ariz.App. 138, 400 P.2d 345, 349 (1965), 
vacated on other grounds, 99 Ariz. 363, 409 P.2d 285 (1965); 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. D.N. Morrison Construction Co. , 
116 Fla. 66, 156 So. 385, 387 (1934); Hartley v. The Red Ball 
Transit Co.. 344 111. 534, 176 N.E. 751, 757 (1931); State v. 
Keeton Packing Co., 487 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex.App. 1972); 3 
C.J.S. Agency @ 547, p. 479. It has also been said that 
while the existence of agency generally presents a question 
of fact, when the underlying facts are not in dispute, the 
question of whether an agency relationship exists is a 
question of law. Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance 
Co. , 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127, 1140 (1982). In what is 
apparently the only Utah case on the subject, the Utah 
Supreme Court seemed to reflect this view, citing the rule 
that agency is "as a general rule a question of fact for the 
jury, aided by proper instructions from the court," then 
distinguished it and affirmed the trial court's withholding 
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of the issue of agency from the jury. Adamson v. United Mine 
Workers, 3 Utah 2d 37, 277 P.2d 972 (1954). 
In this case, the underlying facts are not in dispute: 
none of the testimony is contradicted or challenged as 
untrue. The controversy centers on what legal conclusion to 
draw from those facts: do they "add up" to any sort of 
agency? In such a circumstance, the question of the 
existence of agency is best viewed as a question of law or a 
mixed question of law and fact. 
The trial court tacitly acknowledged the mixed nature of 
its finding of agency by reciting "Rita Luke had the apparent 
authority to bind Prowswood to the terms of the Agreement" as 
both a finding of fact and a conclusion of law. 
Significantly, while a trial court's findings of fact 
will not be set aside on review unless they are clearly 
erroneous, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), mixed questions of law and 
fact are not entitled to similar deference. Maraulies v. 
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). Generally, mixed 
questions of law and fact are treated as questions of law and 
reviewed de novo by the appellate court. State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 464, n. 76 (Utah 1988), citing United States v. 
McConney. 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert, 
denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); accord. State v. Crestani, 771 
P.2d 1085, (Utah 1989). Conclusions of law are reviewed on 
appeal "for correctness without any deference to the trial 
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court•,f Cove View Excavating and Construction Co, v. Flynn, 
758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1988). 
Therefore, the trial court's determination that Rita 
Luke had authority to bind Prowswood is not entitled to 
deference on review, but may be reviewed de novo for 
correctness. 
*>• The Nielsons Cannot Both Claim the Benefit of the 
"Clearly Erroneous" Standard and also Introduce Mew 
Theories of Agency on Appeal. 
The Nielsons cannot deny that agency presents at least a 
mixed question of fact and law without being bound by the 
trial court's "finding" of apparent—not inherent—authority. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court concludes that 
Prowswood1s liability is based "on the apparent authority of 
Ms. Luke as shown to plaintiffs." Memorandum Decision, p. 7. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, drafted by the 
Nielsons, speak exclusively of apparent authority. The trial 
court appeared to be quite clear on the legal principle on 
which it relied. 
Yet on appeal, the Nielsons rely most heavily on the 
theory of inherent authority, which the trial court never 
mentioned. In so doing they argue that an appellate court 
should affirm a judgment if it is sustainable "on any legal 
theory apparent on the record, even if it different from the 
theory stated by the trial court as the basis for its ruling 
. . ." (Emphasis added.) Respondentfs Brief, p. 21, n.4. 
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Implicit in this argument is the assumption that what is at 
issue here is not a factual finding but a legal conclusion: 
what legal theory best accommodates the undisputed facts? 
If the difference is indeed one of legal theory only, 
and Prowswood believes that it is, the clearly erroneous 
standard does not apply, and the trial court's decision is 
reviewable for correctness. 
If, on the other hand, the trial court's finding of 
apparent authority was one of pure fact—an assumption of the 
Nielson's contention that the "clearly erroneous" standard 
applies—a finding of inherent authority would also be a 
purely factual finding. Affirming on that basis would 
therefore require this Court to find a fact that the trial 
court never found. 
c. Construction of a Written Document Presents a 
Question of Law on Appeal. 
The trial court also concluded that Prowswood ratified 
the Agreement. The Nielsons defend this conclusion by 
reliance upon Richard S. Prows1 letter of June 10, 1986. 
They admit that no extrinsic evidence supports the conclusion 
of ratification. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. Indeed, the only 
relevant extrinsic evidence was the uncontradicted testimony 
of Richard S. Prows that Prowswood did not consider itself 
obligated to repurchase the property. 
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The trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous 
written document, unaided by reference to extrinsic evidence, 
is accorded no particular weight on review, but will be 
reviewed under a correctness standard. Craig Food 
Industries, Inc. v. Weihincr, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 
1987). Consequently, the proper standard for this Court to 
apply in reviewing the trial courtfs finding or conclusion of 
ratification is simply whether it was correct, without 
indulging any deference to the trial court's determination. 
2. 
THE ISSUE OF RITA LUKE'S AUTHORITY, INCLUDING 
WRITTEN AUTHORITY, WAS TRIED AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
It is indisputable that the statute of frauds is an 
affirmative defense that must be pled. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
What is less clear is when the statute of frauds may be said 
to have been pled. 
While it is true that Prowswood did not cite Section 25-
5-1 or 25-5-3 in its Answer, or use the words, "statute of 
frauds," it may not be assumed without analysis that 
Prowswood failed to affirmatively plead this defense. 
Indeed, many courts have held that a denial of the existence 
of a contract is sufficient to raise the statute of frauds. 
See, e.g. , Hunt v. Hunt, 261 N.C. 437, 135 S.E.2d 195, 199 
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(1964); Padaham v. Wilson Music Co,, 3 Wis.2d 363, 88 N.W.2d 
679, 683 (1958). 
Prowswood1s Answer meets or exceeds this principle. 
Prowswood affirmatively alleged that "the acts of the 
Defendant Rita Luke were without the express, implied or 
apparent authority of the Defendant Prowswood, Ltd. . . ." 
Answer of Prowswood, Fifth Defense. This allegation was not 
merely a general denial of liability, but went directly to 
Rita Lukefs authority. If she lacked express, implied, or 
apparent authority, she surely lacked written authority. 
This allegation was therefore sufficient to put all parties 
to the action on notice that the lack of written 
authorization was an issue to be tried. The policy of Rule 
8(c) was thus fulfilled. 
Furthermore, since the Nielsons conducted no discovery 
even on issues set forth in detail in the pleadings, failure 
to plead the statute of frauds with greater specificity 
worked no prejudice against them insofar as pretrial 
discovery was concerned. 
Finally, the lack of written authorization was implicit 
in the Independent Contract Agreement between Rita Luke and 
Prowswood, which, like the statute of frauds, required 
written authorization for her to enter into a contract to 
purchase real estate. This Agreement was entered into 
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evidence at trial. Exhibit 4-P. Thus, the issue of written 
authority was before the trial court at trial. 
Obviously, Prowswood would have preferred leave to amend 
its Answer based upon its motion filed more than one month 
prior to trial. This housekeeping measure would have 
obviated any dispute later. But this Court may still 
conclude, and should conclude, that Prowswood did not waive 
its defense of the statute of frauds. 
3. 
RITA LUKE WAS NOT PROWSWOODfS GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT, 
SO THE MATHIS EXCEPTION TO SECTION 25-5-1 DOES NOT APPLY 
Respondents cite evidence from which the trial court 
could possibly have concluded that Rita Luke was Prowswood fs 
general agent. Brief of Respondents, p. 16. In fact, the 
trial court did not so conclude, but even if it had, its 
conclusion would have been mistaken. 
Mathis v. Madsen. 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952, 956 (1953) 
reads into Utah Code Ann. @ 25-5-1 an exception for general 
agents or executive officers of corporations. In that case, 
the . agent was General Manager and President of the 
corporation. 
The Nielsons contend that Rita Luke was Prowswood !s 
general agent because she was "authorized to conduct a series 
of transactions involving a continuity of service," the test 
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set out in Restatement (Second) of Agency @ 3(1)(1957). 
Prowswood concedes that Ms. Luke was its general agent for 
purposes of selling listed real estate, since she did conduct 
a series of such transactions over a period of years. She 
was therefore a general agent with respect to selling listed 
properties. But she never purchased properties for 
Prowswood. 
Comment b. to the Restatement section quoted above 
addresses just this situation: 
One is a general agent only as to those matters in 
which there is continuity of employment. Thus one 
who is a general agent with respect to some matters 
may be a special agent with respect to a particular 
transaction, as where the owner of a manufacturing 
business directs his manager to purchase a country 
estate for him. 
(Emphasis added.) Unlike selling properties, purchasing 
properties was not a matter "in which there [was] a 
continuity of employment." Indeed, the Nielsons were unable 
to cite even a single instance where Ms. Luke purchased 
property on behalf of Prowswood. Therefore, with respect to 
purchasing properties she was a special agent only, and the 
Mathis exception to Section 25-5-1 does not apply. 
To ignore this qualification to the general rule of the 
Restatement would effectively repeal Section 25-5-1 for 
corporations. It would, for example, permit a real estate 
agent without written authority to sell his broker's personal 
residence or to obligate her to purchase a second residence. 
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4. 
NEITHER SECTION 61-2-2(3) NOR WHITE V, FOX APPLIES HERE 
The Nielsons rely upon Utah Code Ann. @ 61-2-2(7) and 
White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983) to support the trial 
court's conclusion that Rita Luke had apparent authority to 
bind Prowswood to purchase the property. In fact, these 
authorities are irrelevant to a determination of apparent 
authority. The third partyfs reliance on the purported 
principal's statements or actions regarding the agent's 
authority is the sina qua non of apparent authority, and 
there is not a shred of evidence that the Nielsons ever 
relied upon any statement or act of Prowswood here. Mr. 
Nielson himself testified that he did not. See Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 144. 
However, these authorities are relevant to a different 
theory of agency, which may perhaps be called "statutory 
agency," since it seems to owe its existence solely to one 
statutory provision. Although the trial court did not 
address this theory, the Nielsons urge it on appeal. 
The former Section 61-2-3, predecessor to our present 
Section 61-2-2(3), was part of Title 61, Chapter 2, "Division 
of Real Estate." It was strictly definitional in nature. It 
defined a real estate salesman as one "employed or engaged on 
behalf of a licensed real estate broker to do or to deal in 
any act or transaction" listed within the definition of a 
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broker. In White, the Utah Supreme Court read this section 
not as a definition, but as a grant of power. It also read 
the word "any" to mean "all." Thus it wrote, "Our statutes 
provide that, subject to certain limitations, real estate 
agents are empowered to perform all acts or transactions that 
their real estate broker may perform." 665 P.2d at 1302 
(emphasis added). Prowswood submits that this was a 
misreading of the statutory intent of that section. 
However, based on that reading, the court reasoned that 
since the broker could waive his own commission, his real 
estate agent could waive the commission of his broker, in 
that case Parley White dba Parley White Realty Company. Id. 
While the reasoning of White is dubious, the Nielsons 
would extend it even further, arguing by analogy that since a 
broker may bind himself to purchase property, his real estate 
agent can bind the broker to purchase property. Therefore, 
they reason, since Prowswood could bind itself to purchase 
the Kochfs condominium, Rita Luke had statutory authority to 
bind Prowswood to purchase the condominium. There are a 
number of reasons why this line of reasoning should be 
rejected: 
First. Section 61-2-2 is definitional: a person who 
does any one of certain enumerated acts is deemed to be a 
"real estate sales agent" for purposes of the Chapter and 
therefore subject to its provisions. This section was not 
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intended to grant every real estate agent blanket authority 
to do everything his broker could do. If a person must be 
authorized to perform every act within the definition of a 
broker to be a real estate agent, then Rita Luke was not one, 
because she had no authority to obligate anyone to purchase 
property. 
Second. A broker qua broker may purchase property "for 
another" and, as in White, to collect commissions. Section 
61-2-2(1). Additionally, a broker has the same right as 
other persons to purchase property for himself, in which case 
the Chapter does not apply. See Section 61-2-3. 
The Nielsons fail to observe this distinction. They 
urge this Court to apply the Chapter in a situation where 
Prowswood would purchase real estate for itself. To do so, 
this Court would have to extend Section 61-2-2 past even 
White. Whatever its flaws, at least White only empowered the 
real estate agent to bind his broker to a transaction in his 
role as a broker, where he acted for another; the Nielsons 
would empower a real estate agent to bind her broker with 
respect to a transaction for itself. and therefore a 
transaction outside the Chapter. 
Third. In White, there was no contractual provision 
relevant to the scope of the agent's authority. Therefore, 
holding that Section 61-2-2 defined the limits of the agent's 
authority did no violence to a lawful contract. Here, Rita 
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Luke's authority was expressly limited by the following 
provision in Paragraph 9 of her contract with Prowswood: 
[Luke] shall have no authority to incur any 
expense, enter any contract or make any 
representation or committment [sic] for and on 
behalf of [Prowswood] unless such authority is 
specifically given, in writing, with respect to 
each such transaction. 
Holding Section 61-2-2 applicable to this case would wreak 
havoc in the real estate industry by instantly invalidating 
every limitation on every broker's delegation of authority to 
every real estate agent in the State of Utah. Such a ruling 
would represent a broad and unwarranted extension of White. 
Fourth. Most importantly, the fatal flaw in the 
Nielsons' attempt to apply White here is that Prowswood was 
not Rita Luke's broker. The uncontested evidence at trial 
established that her broker as of the date of the Luke 
Agreement, November 29, 1985, was Mr. John Langley. 
Therefore, the only conclusion permissible under White is 
that Rita Luke had authority to bind John Langley, who is not 
a party to this action. 
Moreover, Mr. Langley's uncontradicted proffer of 
testimony was that he had no authority to purchase real 
property on behalf of Prowswood. Therefore, even if, under 
White, Rita Luke had statutory authority to do every act 
which John Langley was authorized to do, still she lacked 
authority to bind Prowswood to the Agreement. 
5. 
LUKE LACKED INHERENT AUTHORITY TO BIND PROWSWOOD 
The Nielsons argue on appeal that Rita Luke had inherent 
authority to bind Prowswood. 
a. The Trial Court Did Not Find Inherent Authority, 
The trial court did not find that Rita Luke had inherent 
authority in either its Memorandum Decision or its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. There is therefore no 
finding of fact to which this Court must defer on appeal. 
But even if there were, a determination of agency may be 
viewed as a mixed question of law and fact and reviewed de 
novo for correctness. See pp. 4-6 supra. 
Prowswood did not address this theory in its Brief of 
Appellant because it was not apparent in the Court's 
Memorandum Decision, Findings, or Conclusions. As pointed 
out above, pressing this theory on appeal, as the Nielsons 
do, is consistent only with the view that a finding of 
inherent authority is not factual in nature but a mixed 
question of law and fact, and therefore entitled to no 
particular deference by this Court. 
Indeed, there is no factual conflict on this issue in 
any event, only a question of the legal significance of 
largely uncontradicted facts. 
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b. The Evidence Does Not Support a Finding of Inherent 
Authority. 
The doctrine of inherent authority is twofold. One 
aspect concerns the nature of the agent's acts. The other 
concerns the level of knowledge or belief of the third party. 
Under the doctrine of inherent authority, an agent's 
acts bind her principal only if they "fall within the 
apparent scope" of her authority, Harrison v. Auto Securities 
Co. . 70 Utah 11, 18, 257 P. 677, 679 (1927), or, under the 
Restatement's version of the rule, "usually accompany or are 
incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to 
conduct." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 161 (1957). 
Rita Luke's acts meet neither criterion. The Nielsons 
claim that "It is a common marketing technique for a broker 
to agree to purchase property in order to obtain a listing or 
a sale, with its attendant commission." Brief of 
Respondents, p. 19. This statement finds no basis in the 
evidence and is merely the naked assertion of counsel. The 
Nielsons cite only the testimony of Richard S. Prows. He 
testified that while "there have been occasions" where 
Prowswood would agree to purchase a property, "it is 
uncommon" that it would take trade-ins. He also testified 
that Prowswood would "not normally" have a program where if 
someone buys its product it would buy theirs, but would do so 
only on "very rare occasions." 
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The Nielsons1 own expert witness, Wilburn McDougal, was 
hardly more supportive of their position. Contrary to the 
Nielsons1 representation that Mr. McDougal "testified that 
•most companies1 in this area have some type of guaranteed 
sales program . . ." Brief of Respondents, p.23 (emphasis 
added), he in fact testified, "I think most companies have 
had some type of a guaranteed sales program" (emphasis 
added). The clear implication of this statement is that 
while most companies have in the past had guaranteed sales 
programs, they no longer do. With respect to his own 
company, Mr. McDougal further testified as follows: 
Q Were agents authorized to sign that 
[guaranteed buy-back] agreement? 
A We have, in the last ten years we've had times 
when it is only my signature that is authorized or one 
of my managers or certain real estate agents, those that 
had the experience. 
Q So agents as a whole were not authorized to 
sign? 
A No, some agents were authorized. It is an 
individual situation. 
Q So some agents were not authorized to sign? 
A This is right. 
Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p.132. 
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The testimony before the trial court on the issue of 
whether it was usual for an agent to be authorized to enter 
into a guaranteed sales agreement may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Guaranteed sales programs were very uncommon for 
Prowswood. 
2. Many companies have had such programs in the past, 
3. McDougal realty has had such programs. 
4. Sometimes only Mr. McDougal was authorized to sign 
a guaranteed sales agreement. 
5. Sometimes one of his managers was authorized to 
sign. 
6. Sometimes certain real estate agents were 
authorized to sign. 
7. At no time were all real estate agents authorized 
to sign. 
This testimony falls far short of meeting the Nielsons1 
burden of proving that the authority to purchase property is 
apparent merely from the fact that a person is a real estate 
agent; or that the exercise of purchasing authority is usual 
for real estate agents in general; or that it is incidental 
to those acts—such as listing and selling property—that are 
within a real estate agent's actual authority. 
The second aspect of inherent authority focuses on the 
third party, who must be "innocent," must have "dealt with 
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those agents in good faith," Harrison, supra, at 679, must 
reasonably believe the agent is authorized, and must have no 
notice that she is not authorized. Restatement (Second) § 
161. 
Mr. Nielson was hardly an "innocent" third party. On 
the contrary, he was knowledgeable in the field of real 
estate, having been a licensed real estate broker in 
California and a licensed real estate broker in Utah since 
1962. He was also knowledgeable about Prowswood, since he 
had previously been employed by a Prowswood subsidiary, 
TransWest Building Supply, as a vice president in charge of 
day-to-day operations. Also, his son-in-law, Vince Clayton, 
was a Prowswood employee. He was aptly described by his 
counsel at trial: "Mr. Nielson is a sophisticated man, there 
[is] no question about that." Trial Transcript Vol. 1, p. 6. 
Mr. Nielson's experience and sophistication put him on 
notice that Ms. Luke might not be authorized to bind 
Prowswood. He testified at trial that he was "concerned as 
to whether or not a salesperson had authority to bind 
Prowswood" to purchase the condominium. A reasonable person 
with Mr. Nielsonfs sophistication, concern, experience, and 
family contacts would have taken some step, such as placing a 
single telephone call, to verify with Prowswood the authority 
that Ms. Luke claimed. But Mr. Nielson did nothing. 
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In short, the Nielsons have failed to make a showing, 
either below or on appeal, that Rita Luke had inherent 
authority to bind Prowswood. 
6. 
RICHARD S. PROWS' LETTER DID NOT RATIFY THE AGREEMENT 
Since they do not respond to Prowswood's arguments, the 
Nielsons apparently concede that Prowswood's acceptance of a 
real estate commission from the Koches cannot constitute a 
ratification of the Luke Agreement. See Brief of Appellant, 
Point 3. 
Instead, they contend that the letter of June 10, 1986 
from Richard S. Prows to the Nielsons ratified the Luke 
Agreement. 
As explained in Point I.e. above, a trial court's 
interpretation of a written document, without reliance upon 
extrinsic testimony, is entitled to no deference on appeal 
but presents a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. See pp. 7-8, supra. 
To ratify an act is to knowingly manifest an intent to 
treat it as though it was authorized—to be bound by it—when 
in fact it was unauthorized and not binding. See Bradshaw v. 
McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982); Restatement (Second) of 
Agency §@ 82 & 83. 
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A copy of Mr. Prows1 June 10, 1986 letter is included in 
the Addendum to Prowswood's Brief of Appellant. Even a 
cursory reading of this document will disclose that Mr. Prows 
never manifested an intention to be bound by any agreement 
that would obligate Prowswood to purchase the Nielson's 
condominium. In fact, he emphatically denied any such 
obligation. Consider the following facts. 
Every reference to the Luke Agreement is placed in 
quotation marks: the "agreement." Use of quotation marks in 
this manner has the effect of negating the meaning of the 
quoted term. Thus, a reference to a man and his "wife" 
carries the clear implication that they are not in fact 
married. Similarly, referring to a "joke" communicates 
unmistakably that the attempt at humor was not in fact 
amusing. In this context, the quotation marks clearly 
conveyed Mr. Prows1 belief that no agreement between the 
Nielsons and Prowswood existed. Had he ratified the Luke 
Agreement, he would have acknowledged its efficacy, not 
denied it. 
In Paragraph 4 of his June 10 letter, Mr. Prows 
expressed concern to treat the dispute delicately in view of 
Prowswood's feelings of friendship toward the Nielsons. But 
despite those feelings, he never acknowledged any willingness 
to purchase the property. 
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In the letter's penultimate paragraph, Mr. Prows 
insisted that since Mr. Nielson was both a Utah real estate 
broker and a former Prowswood employee, it must have occurred 
to him that the commitment "you felt Rita was making when she 
signed the "agreement" you prepared, was far in excess of the 
authority granted to her . . . " In other words, Mr. Prows, 
far from adopting Ms. Luke's acts, continued to disclaim 
them. This fact eloquently refutes the Nielsons' 
construction of his letter. 
In short, Prowswood submits that it is not possible to 
reasonably detect in this letter any intent on the part of 
Prowswood "to ratify the Agreement and stand behind its 
leading sales agent, regardless of the outcome." Brief of 
Respondents, p. 26. Mr. Prows was very specific as to 
outcomes: Prowswood would waive its commission, but it would 
not purchase the unit. 
Under the law, ratification requires that the purported 
principal have "an intent to ratify" Bradshaw v. McBride, 
649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982), that is, an intent to be bound 
by the acts of the purported agent. The only intent 
expressed in Richard S. Prows' June 10, 1986 letter is an 
intent not to purchase the property from the Nielsons. 
Therefore, no ratification could have occurred. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's rulings were ill-conceived, as 
witnessed by the Nielsons' arguments before this Court, which 
attempt to recast the record into legal categories defensible 
on appeal. But even artful arguments cannot make a silk 
purse out of the judgment below, which should be reversed. 
DATED: July^C^/, 1989 
POOLE & SMITH 
Poole 
Frederic Voros, Jr. 
itorneys for Defendant-
spell ant Prowswood 
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